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1962/10/22

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III

UN ASPECTS OF CUBAN SITUATION

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/D/CDR/MR

REVIEWED BY Bob Blundin DATE 7/16/89

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~~EXCISE~~ D

BIAS

1. Nature of US Political Proposal in SC;
2. Observations on Military Action;
3. Action short of Military Action

1. The type of political proposal which would strike

our military steps, and possible set in chain events that

would "solve" the Cuban problem would be: (a) a proposal that

Cuba be "neutralized", with a neutral government, all foreign bases and installations withdrawn, types of weapons limited,

etc.; (b) that large scale UN ~~mm~~ observer force be put into

Cuba to guarantee this; and (c) call for ending of any

military action in terms acceptable to us. Some further

guarantees along the Laos line might be possible. If neutral

are sufficiently ~~fit~~ frightened by the situation, this

proposal

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proposal might be accepted. In any case it would set in train other steps along such lines -- possible SYG good offices to achieve a solution. If such proposals to remove the Cuban threat were turned down (the GA could hardly avoid ~~me~~ something on these lines) by Cuba or the uSSR, we would be in a greatly improved political position should further steps have to be taken.

Nothing much short of such a bold proposal would do the job.

2. Military action is presumed to be underway at the outset of and parallel to the above program. They can, and probably should, go on simultaneously. "Tough" unilateral and OAS action will show we mean business while the olive branch we hold out in the UN would show we would accept a

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reasonable political solution. [Stepped-up internal subversion, for example, could go on for some time and might exert heavy pressures on Cuba.] *AN/AC/15/15*

Concerning the nature of military action, a naval blockade of Cuba authorized by the OAS would be more defensible than an air strike. It would not be quite as "overt" as the latter. No one would be killed at the outset at least. It would be more "passive" and therefore more equivalent as a "retaliation" (acceptable in international law) to a "passive" act against us. It would be more likely to get OAS approval; it is doubtful that an air strike would. It would also be less apt to provoke a counter-air retaliation elsewhere, such as against bases in Turkey. It allows ~~to~~ more time for a political process to take over.

On the other hand, of course, it would not eliminate an immediate

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immediate security threat. Its long-range application puts us directly in conflict with the USSR, whose ships we would be stopping, rather than only with Cuba. It would also ~~in~~ hasten Soviet tightening of the access noose around Berlin, although it would also give us a direct bargaining point against a noose they already have around Berlin's neck. (The noose might also be tightened as the result of an air strike.)

If any OAS action an ~~is~~ open-ended paragraph should be sought under which we could take other military action if necessary.

Further consideration, weighed in the light of broad hemispheric considerations, might also be given to the proposal for a Caribbean defense treaty. The impression

of serious action this gives would be valuable ~~psychologically~~ psychologically

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psychologically, while its long-range application might create opportunities for multi-lateral military support to prevent further Cubas in the weak countries of Central America.

3. The OAS might also be asked to invoke as a binding obligation all the measures short of "enforcement action" of the Security Council, i.e. the measures of Art. 41 of the Charter: complete interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio and other means of ~~minimum~~ communication and the severance of diplomatic & relations.

(These actions -- as LA's interpret the UN Charter -- can be taken even in the absence of aggression and without SC approval.)

If the political and military situations do not require more far reaching action and action along this line

only were taken, subsequent tactical ideas would be different

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different. We would not have to go to the SC but could
wait for an OAS report; we would also not need the big
political program.⁷

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